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I.S.B. #9525
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
JAMES WEST-EATON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43473
BANNOCK COUNTY
NO. CR 2008-19036
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Mr. West-Eaton argued the district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over him and when it denied his motion
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction of sentence.
(App. Br., pp.4-7.) In its brief, the State argues Mr. West-Eaton’s appeal is untimely
because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it entered its June 25,
2015 order relinquishing jurisdiction. (Resp. Br., p.3.) The State contends the district
court’s jurisdiction expired on December 28, 2009, at which time Mr. West-Eaton
automatically remained committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
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(Resp. Br., p.3.) Because the State had multiple opportunities to challenge the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and failed to do so for over six years, its jurisdictional
challenge is barred by res judicata.
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule
14(a), and should conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. West-Eaton and denied his Rule 35 motion. If this
Court concludes that the State’s jurisdictional challenge is not barred by res judicata,
and that every decision entered by the district court subsequent to December 28, 2009
is void, then this Court should issue an opinion deeming Mr. West-Eaton to have been
committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections on December 28, 2009, and
giving him credit for all periods of incarceration that he served from December 28, 2009,
to the present.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 1, 2009, the district court entered the original judgment in this case,
sentencing Mr. West-Eaton to a unified term of seven years, with three years fixed, and
retaining jurisdiction for a period of 180 days pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601(4).
(R., pp.89-92.)

On December 31, 2009, the district court entered the first of three

orders purporting to extend the period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.94-95.) As the
State correctly points out, this order was entered three days after the period of retained
jurisdiction had expired. (Resp. Br., p.3.)
Mr. West-Eaton is not appealing from the district court’s first (or second or third)
order purporting to extend the original period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.94-95, 9798, 119-20.)

Nor is Mr. West-Eaton appealing from the district court’s subsequent
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decision to suspend his sentence and place him on probation for a period of eight years.
(R., pp.123-32.) Nor is Mr. West-Eaton appealing from the district court’s subsequent
decision to revoke his probation and execute his original sentence, retaining jurisdiction
for a period of 365 days. (R., pp.181-88.) Instead, Mr. West-Eaton is appealing from
the district court’s subsequent decision to relinquish jurisdiction and execute his original
sentence. The district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. West-Eaton was
entered on June 25, 2015. (R., pp.193-97.) Mr. West-Eaton filed a timely notice of
appeal on July 29, 2015, which he amended on September 22, 2015, after the district
court denied his Rule 35 motion and his motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.204-07,
232-35.)
The State did not challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court in
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 or 2015, but raises a jurisdictional challenge for the
first time in this appeal.
ISSUES
1.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider this appeal?

2.

Is the State’s challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction barred by
res judicata?

3.

If the State’s jurisdictional challenge is barred by res judicata, did the district
court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. West-Eaton
and denied his Rule 35 motion?

4.

If the State’s jurisdictional challenge is not barred by res judicata, should this
Court issue an opinion deeming Mr. West-Eaton to have been committed to the
custody of the Department of Corrections on December 28, 2009, and giving him
credit for all periods of incarceration that he served from December 28, 2009, to
the present?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Has Jurisdiction To Consider This Appeal
The district court entered its order relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. West-Eaton
on June 25, 2015. (R., pp.193-97.) “Any appeal as a matter of right from the district
court must be filed within forty-two days of the judgment.” State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55,
60 (2015); see also I.A.R. 14(a). “A timely appeal is necessary to vest jurisdiction in this
Court to review issues raised with respect to the district court’s actions.” Wolfe, 158
Idaho at 60 (citation omitted). Mr. West-Eaton filed a notice of appeal on July 29, 2015,
which was within the time set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a), and was thus timely.
(R., pp.204-07.) Mr. West-Eaton subsequently amended his notice of appeal to include
the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.232-35.) This Court thus has
jurisdiction to consider this issue as well. See Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 60 (concluding it had
jurisdiction to consider issue included in amended notice of appeal). The State seeks to
challenge an order entered by the district court on December 31, 2009, but the State did
not file a timely notice of appeal—or, indeed, any notice of appeal—challenging that
decision.
II.
The State’s Challenge To The District Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction Is Barred By
Res Judicata
The State contends the district court’s jurisdiction expired on December 28,
2009, and all decisions entered by the district court subsequent to that date are voie.
(Resp. Br., p.3.) The State relies on three cases in support of its position, State v.
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Taylor, 142 Idaho 30 (2005), State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158 (2010), abrogated on
other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011), and
State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808 (Ct. App. 2010). (Resp. Br., pp.3-4.) None of these
cases involve a scenario where the party challenging jurisdiction waited over six years
to raise the issue. And, on the contrary, this Court held in State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55,
that the interest in finality can trump a potential jurisdictional issue, and that res judicata
can bar a jurisdictional claim. Consistent with Wolfe, this Court should conclude that the
State’s jurisdictional challenge is barred by res judicata.
In State v. Taylor, the State appealed from a judgment by the district court issued
after the expiration of the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction, which purported to
suspend Mr. Taylor’s sentence and place him on probation. 142 Idaho at 30. This
Court reversed the district court’s judgment concluding the district court lacked
jurisdiction to suspend Mr. Taylor’s sentence following the expiration of the 180-day
period. Id. at 31.
In State v. Urrabazo, Mr. Urrabazo appealed from the district court’s orders
relinquishing jurisdiction over him two months into his second successive 180-day
period of retained jurisdiction. 150 Idaho at 160. This Court first held that under the
plain language of the statute, a district court cannot order two successive periods of
retained jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation. Id. at 160. This Court
then held that because the district court failed to place Mr. Urrabazo on probation prior
to the expiration of the first period of retained jurisdiction, “the court’s orders, granting a
second rider and relinquishing jurisdiction on the same, are void for want of subject
matter jurisdiction and [Mr.] Urrabazo’s appeal is untimely.” Id. at 163.
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In State v. Peterson, Mr. Peterson appealed from the district court’s order
relinquishing jurisdiction over him after the expiration of the 180-day period of retained
jurisdiction. 149 Idaho at 810. The district court relinquished jurisdiction after it had
attempted to extend the period of retained jurisdiction, but determined it lacked authority
to do so because the period had already expired. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
concluding the statute requires that the period of retained jurisdiction be extended
before its expiration. Id. at 814.
In each of these three cases, the party raising the jurisdictional challenge did not
delay in raising the issue. In Taylor, the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction expired
on March 29, 2004, and the district court entered an order suspending Mr. Taylor’s
sentence and placing him on probation on April 22, 2004. 142 Idaho at 31. The State
appealed from that order.

Id. at 30.

In Urrabazo, the 180-day period of retained

jurisdiction expired on May 6, 2006, and the district court entered an order relinquishing
jurisdiction over Mr. Urrabazo on July 28, 2006. 150 Idaho at 159-60. Mr. Urrabazo
appealed from that order, and the State argued the district court lacked jurisdiction. Id.
at 160-61. In Peterson, the district court issued an order relinquishing jurisdiction after
realizing it had not extended the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction until ten days
after the expiration of that period. 149 Idaho at 810. Mr. Peterson filed a Rule 35
motion, which the district court denied, and Mr. Peterson appealed from that order. Id.
Here, the State could have appealed from any of the district court’s three orders
purporting to extend the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction. These orders were
entered on December 31, 2009, January 13, 2010, and March 5, 2010. (R., pp.94-95,
97-98, 119-20.) Alternatively, the State could have appealed from the district court’s
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order, entered April 6, 2010, suspending Mr. West-Eaton’s sentence and placing him on
probation. (R., pp.123-32.) Had the State appealed from any of these four orders and
raised a challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction, it likely would have been successful
under Taylor, Urrabazo, and Peterson.
However, the State did not appeal from any of these four orders. Instead, the
State waited until March 3, 2016, when it filed its brief in this case, to challenge the
district court’s jurisdiction. On these facts, the State’s jurisdictional challenge is barred
by the doctrine of res judicata. This Court held in State v. Wolfe that “res judicata
applies to subject matter jurisdiction claims.” 158 Idaho at 63. This Court recognized in
Wolfe that “res judicata’s preclusive effect bars ‘not only subsequent re-litigation of a
claim previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of any claims relating to the
same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made’ in the
first suit.” Id. (quoting Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94 (2002)). In Wolfe, the
Court held that Mr. Wolfe was barred by res judicata “from re-litigating the subject
matter jurisdiction issue in his second Rule 35 motion” even though the district court
disposed of the first Rule 35 motion on procedural grounds. 158 Idaho at 66.
Like in Wolfe, this Court should hold that the State is barred by res judicata from
challenging the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, when it could have raised the
issue in any number of earlier proceedings.

Under Idaho law, “[t]here are three

requirements for the claim preclusive effects of res judicata to apply: (1) both actions
must involve the same parties; (2) the claim alleged to be barred was presented in the
first action or could have been raised; and (3) the first action resulted in a final judgment
on the merits.” State v. Martin, No. 43123, 2016 WL 546327, at *2 (Ct. App. Feb. 12,
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2016) (citing State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863 (2000)). These requirements are
met here. The State could have raised a jurisdictional challenge in the district court at
any time after December 29, 2009. The State also had numerous opportunities to
appeal from decisions it now contends were entered without subject matter jurisdiction,
and could have raised a jurisdictional challenge before this Court. The State failed to do
so, and the district court proceeded to decide matters in this case for six years, in
actions involving the same parties, resulting in judgments on the merits.
III.
If The State’s Jurisdictional Challenge Is Barred By Res Judicata, The District Court
Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Mr. West-Eaton And
Denied His Rule 35 Motion
If this Court agrees with Mr. West-Eaton that the State’s jurisdictional challenge
is barred by res judicata, then, for the reasons stated in Mr. West-Eaton’s opening brief,
this Court should conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. West-Eaton and denied his Rule 35 motion. (App.
Br., pp.4-7.) The State did not argue otherwise in its brief, and Mr. West-Eaton thus
relies on the arguments he made in his opening brief.
IV.
If The State’s Jurisdictional Challenge Is Not Barred By Res Judicata, Then This Court
Should Issue An Opinion Giving Mr. West-Eaton Credit For All Periods Of Incarceration
That He Served From December 28, 2009, To The Present
If this Court concludes that the State’s jurisdictional challenge is not barred by
res judicata, then this Court should issue an opinion deeming Mr. West-Eaton to have
been committed to the Department of Corrections on December 28, 2009, and giving
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him credit for all periods of incarceration that he served from December 28, 2009, to the
present. In its brief, the State asserts “[t]he [district] court’s jurisdiction thus expired on
December 28, 2009, at which time [Mr.] West-Eaton automatically remained committed
to the custody of the Department of Corrections.” (Resp. Br., p.3 (citations omitted).) If
Mr. West-Eaton was automatically committed to the custody of the Department of
Corrections on December 29, 2009, then this Court should give Mr. West-Eaton credit
for all periods of incarceration that he served from December 28, 2009, to the present.
See Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869 (Ct. App. 2008); see also I.C. § 18-309
(granting a defendant credit for “any period of incarceration”).
CONCLUSION
Mr. West-Eaton respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s
order relinquishing jurisdiction over him and place him back on probation. Alternatively,
he requests that this case be remanded to the district court for a new rider review
hearing and/or Rule 35 hearing. If this Court determines that the district court’s subject
matter jurisdiction expired on December 28, 2009, then Mr. West-Eaton requests that
the Court’s opinion give Mr. West-Eaton credit for all periods of incarceration that he
served from December 28, 2009, to the present.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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